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"For an evil which is not felt, and which is, therefore, considered a
trifle and little thought of, draws after it consequences only so much thet
more disastrous" (Wickliff, as quoted by Neander).

Some time since a distinguished judge, now dead,
,vent out of his way to commend, in the name of the
Supreme Court of the United States, the new departure
in criminal legislation and the administration of criminal
justice in extending the jurisdiction and forms of procedure
of courts of equity to the statutory misdemeanor of selling
intoxicants. At that time an article was inserted in the
Evening Post, of New York, deprecating the legislation
and the commendatory expressions of the Supreme Court.
A learned judge requested that the objections should be
pointed out. Not that he doubted as to the impropriety
of the legislation, but as it is evident that when such a
court as the Supreme Court of the United States allowed
a commendation by one of its number, while speaking for
the whole bench, to pass unchallenged, it is impossible to
rely on the mere legal instinct as sufficient to condemn it.
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The commendatory expressions referred to are found in the
case of Rilenbecken v. Plymouth County.'
Before speaking of this case, it may be said that it is
quite evident, from reports ofjudgments in the daily press,
that many judges are assuming to use the forms of equity
jurisdiction over crimes-not, of course, of crimes generally,
this would be an absurdity too great-and also in matters
to which the same objections exist, as in the particular
instance to which I refer-political elections, strikes of
workmen, etc. Believing this.subject belongs to political
jurisprudence, and that its importance is measured only by
the value of the rule that removes criminal jurisprudence
from even the apparent caprice of the judiciary and compels the intervention of a public trial with the witnesses
and the accused brought face to face, a jury to determine
the facts, the public discussion of the admissibility and
effect of evidence, and a fixed standard of punishment, with
a right to a review and to an appeal to the pardoning
power, I now propose to point out the one sufficient objection to the new system.
It may be well to state the particulars of the case of
Eilenbecken v. Plymouth County.
Iowa, by a statute, prohibited the selling or other distribution of intoxicants. It then conferred on the courts
the power of a Court of Chancery to deal with the violation
of the statute. For this purpose it declared the act of
selling to be a nuisance, as also the place where it was
done, and, while limiting the penalty, it gave the court
the power to restrain the sale .by an injunction and to
punish the breach of the mandate like a court of equity.
There are absurdities and iniquities in the statute that
seem incredible. The provisions that have had the approval of the Supreme Court, however, have alone been
stated. The suppressed provisions might well be referred
to as illustrating the disastrous consequences that may
follow from a disregard of the rule on which, more than
1134 U. S., 31. An abstract of this case and the commendatory expressions of the Court referred to will be found in note at the end of this
article.
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on anything else, all civil and political liberty depends,the reputation for purity of the judiciary itself; and also the
consequences of committing legislation to persons who apparently are ignorant of the foundations of that liberty.
To enable one not a lawyer to comprehend the question it is necessary to say this much as to what is called
chancery or equity jurisdiction. It is an exceptional
jurisdiction. It was designed to furnish a kind of redress
that the law did not and could not give; to deal with 4ights
of property not recognized by the law, but established by
courts of equity. It has always, and by every author or
court been recognized as confined to matters of property;
and to cases where the law failed to furnish an adequate
remedy, and never to have any right to interfere in respect
to the rights of persons as distinguished from property,
much less with crimes or anything involving persons or
personal liberty. Its mode of procedure differs from that
of the law. Its remedies are as wholly different as the compelling of the doing of an act differs from merely exacting
compensation as estimated by a jury for not doing it. And
out of this, and as a part of this very exceptional and
peculiar power of compelling the delivery of a specific
thing under penalty of imprisonment until it is delivered,
or restraining or compelling the performance of an act
under the same penalty, there was invented a writ or form
of procedure called injunction, which is simply a writ commanding the doing or prohibiting the doing of some defined act which is enforced by imprisonment at the discretion of the judge. The disobedience is called contenift,
that is disregard of the command of the judge.' 'I'he capacity to determine whether there is a violation
of this order depends upon the discretion of the judge. It
is not necessary that there shall be a trace left of the proof
or evidence, for it may all be by unwritten testimony, and
it may all be exfiarte without the accused seeing the witnesses or having an opportunity to ask them a single
question.
Now this system, confined as it has been to mere mat'See 35 Ch. Div., 455.
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ters of property-to commands not to do some particular
act relative to property, such as not to negotiate a bill, or
not to build or not to pull down until a final hearing-has
never been complained of. On the contrary, it is one of
the most useful of all the forms given us for administering
justice, and this arises from the fact that passions are excluded when the rights of property alone are under consideration, and the remedy is a provisional, temporary and
protective remedy only. Is it wise or prudent, is it consistent with the great fundamental laws that protect civil
liberty, to extend this sort of remedy to crimes and misdemeanors? And if it is inconsistent with these, is that not
a sufficient objection ?
It may be that the uniform voice of the equity lawyers of
England, where the system originated, and by whom alone
it has been formed, will, with some people, be sufficient to
condemn this extension of equity jurisdiction. Not one
solitary feature in the system arises through legislation.
It is all judge-made law, and it is submitted that the
recognition by the equity judges of England of the limitation on equity jurisdiction clearly implies their belief
that it ought to be so limited, seeing that they alone have
ever attempted to set the limits to their own jurisdiction.
That there is no jurisdiction in a court of equity to
prevent crime or any act because it is criminalwas distinctly
decided by Lord ELDOIN, in Lee v. Pritchard.' It was also,
there decided that the publication of a libel could not be
prevented by a court of equity. It is important for our
present purposes to observe that at the same time it was
decided that there was-nothing in the way of the Court preventing the publication or the doing of the act because it
is a crime, if these prohibitions are necessary for the protection of firoierty. This principle was recognized by
Chancellor KENT, and, in fact, made the basis of a great
judgment.' It was also recognized and applied in Springhead v. Riley,3 in 1866, showing that under the reformed
12 Swanston, 44o (1818).
2 Attn.-Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johnson's Rep., 271.
3

L. R. 6 Eq.,

5 5S.
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law no change had taken place in this fundanental rule,
nor had the supposed fusion of law and equity produced
such a revolution as to permit the application of equity
forms and processes to matters involving personal liberty or
merely to illegal and injurious acts not affecting property.
The authority is not a very high one ; but the precise point
was clearly stated and abundantly fortified by authorities
there cited to maintain the proposition, that thejurisdiction
of this Court is to pro/ect hropery. The distinction as
to when a trespass can and cannot be prevented,' the
trespass must amount to waste, that is, an injury for which
damages are not a compensation.' When forged notes may
or may not be restrained, citing Austria v. Day.3 In this
case the eminent patriot Kossuth was preparing to wage
war by flooding his enemies' country with forged currency.
The jurisdiction to restrain this as an invasion of the prerogative was disclaimed, as was any jurisdiction in political
cases, or because a revolution would result. A quotation
is given from this judgment containing the reason upon
which the judgment was rested: "I agree" (it is here Lord
CAMPBELL who speaks) "that the jurisdiction of this Court
in a case of this nature rests on injury to property actual or
prospective, and that this Court has no jurisdiction to prevent the commission of acts which are merely criminal or
merely illegal, and do not affect any rights of property."
Then there is a citation from Lord ELDON'S judgment in
Macauley v. Shackell. " This Court has no criminalIjurisdiction, but it lends its assistance to a man who has in view
of the law a right of property, and who makes out that an
action at law will not be sufficient remedy and protection"
There is no more perfect illustration that property, and
that alone, is the subject of equity jurisdiction than the
judgment of Lord LANGDALE, in Clark v. Preenan,4 coupled
with the comment of that great lawyer, Lord CAIRNS, in
I Lewdes v. Bette, L. J., Ch. 451, by Kindersley, V.C.; Turner v. the
Highway Board, 18 U. R., 424.
-3 D. F. & I., 217.
ri BI. N. S., 76, 127.
i T Beava , 113,
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Maxwell v. Hogg.' The decision was that the manufacture and sale of spurious pills under a false representation
that they were made under a prescription of Sir James
Clark could not be enjoined. Lord CAIRNS' comment was
that Sir James might be said to have a property in his own
name to warrant the interference. Certainly the pills ought
to bear the palm as against the whiskey if the sale of either
could constitute a nuisance. The judgment reviewed in
this case was a very singular one, and savored altogether
of the line of reasoning that, with regret, we are very
familiar with in this country leading to this proposition,
that boycotting and its tribe of crimes could be enjoined
because they are injurious to property. In Prudential v.
Knott these cases will be found to be thus characterized :
"The Vice-Chancellor, in his desire to do what was right,
was led to exaggerate the jurisdiction of this Court in a
manner for which there is no authority in any reported
case, and nofoundation in fPrinczible." 2 The decision cited
deserves notice, it being that of Lord Cairns, Sir W.
M. JAMES and Sir G. MELLISH: There is nojurisdictionto
restrainthejublica/ionof a libel, even though it affects 1-4g11ts
ofProperty.
There is a passage in the judgment of KNIGHT-BRUcE,
V. C., in Soltau v. Deheld,I which perfectly illustrates the
exceptional character of the jurisdiction. An injunction
was asked to restrain a nuisance by the ringing of bells ;
one of the reasons urged was that the ringing of the bells
of Roman Catholic churches was illegal. He said: "That
is perfectly immaterial. . .. because if it be illegal I am
not to grant an injunction to restrain an illegal act merely
because it is illegal. I could not grant an injunction to
restrain a man from smuggling, which is an illegal act.
If it be illegal, the illegality of it is no ground for my inSuppose we extend the jurisdiction to theft or
terfering."
even to gambling. Is it nothing to have a public order
made on a particular person commanding him to abstain
'L. R. 2 Ch., 310.
" Io Chane., 142.
2 Sire. N. S.. 153-4.
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from stealing or gambling? The utmost limit of punishment for the most malicious suit of this kind is the payment of costs; and if we yet introduce the securities given
by the common law against similar accusations, which the
courts cannot, we may ask, why make the change in the
forms of criminal procedure, except to conceal the real
purpose?
There is a striking passage or sentence of Lord LANGDALE, in Ryves v. the Duke of Wellington,1 that may be of
service to gentlemen who conceive that whenever the law fails
to produce the result they desire the remedy may be had in
equity. In that case the Probate Judge had refused to make
an order on George IV to produce and prove the will of
George III, because there was no precedent to compel the
wearer of the crown to produce and prove the will of his
predecessor. The Duke of Wellipgton was the executor
of George IV. This was the equity of the bill, to compel
payment by the executor of the person who had suppressed
the will of'his father. Lord LANGDALE said: "It was
argued that if no remedy can be obtained here, the law of
England does not afford any remedy for an alleged wrong,
such as is stated on this record. I may observe that the
absence of a remedy for a supposed wrong in another place
is not, of itself, any reason for this Court assuming a jurisdiction on the subject; the case must be such as to bring
it properly within the jurisdiction of this Court on other
grounds."
There is a passage in a judgment of a man who stands
second to none in the estimation of the Bar and Bench of
the United States that may possibly be deemed of weight
on this point. It is not a dictum, it is a ratio decidendi of
a very important case. It is the decision of Chancellor
KENT, of New York, in Atty.-Genl. v. the Utica Ins. Co., 2
that a court of equity has no jurisdiction over offences
against a public statute, and could not restrain the violation of an act prohibiting unincorporated banking associations from issuing bills to be used as currency. The real
19 Beav., 6oo.
' 2 Johnson's Ch. R.. 361.
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point of the judgment, apart from precedents, and the replies to the sophistical use of the elementary rules defining
the jurisdiction by misapplying them and perverting the
meaning of words, lies in this sentence: "If a charge be
of a criminal nature or of an offence against the public,
and does not touch the enjoyment of property, it ought not
to be brought within the direct jurisdiction of this Court,
which was intended to deal only in matters of civil 7zghts
resting on equity, or where the remedy at law is not sufficiently adequate."'
The legitimate subject-matter of
equity lies in the two words that have been italicised. And
when the origin of the jurisdiction is considered-that it
is exceptional and of grace, not of right-and also when
we consider the forms or mode of administration and the
remedies, no one will question that there is ample reason
for confining such a jurisdiction to mere matters of property. At the close of the judgment, which well deserves
reading by those who are willing to believe that a thorough
study of the subject and long experience in the administration of justice, both as a common-law and equity judge,
entitle a man to have an opinion, and that opinion to carry
weight, there is this sentence : "The whole question upon
the merits is one of law, and not of equity. The charge is
too much of the nature of a misdemeanor to belong to this
Court." This is as pregnant with the negative principle
of equity jurisdiction as were the two words that have been
italicised with the affirmative.
It may be permitted here to add, if one were to desire
to exhibit this emanation of American politics in all its
grotesqueness, a case reported in 4 th Wallace, State of Mississippi v. Johnson.' The scheme was of the same stamp as
the legislation of Iowa, and also the judicial comments on
that piece of statesmanship.
It was an attempt to obtain an injunction from the
Supreme Court of the United States restraining the President from enforcing certain acts of Congress on the ground
of their unconstitutionality. The Chief Justice (CHASE)
Johnson's Ch. Rep., 378.
Page 476.
2
2
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was probably quite competent to point out the absurdity
of employing equity jurisdiction for such purposes. And
it was most unfortunate that he did not condescend to use
the instrument that such folly and ignorance deserved.
He, however, did not attempt to ridicule the peculiar absurdity of calling in aid the jurisdiction of equity to determine (i) a pure legal question, (2) a political question,
() a question of criminal law determinable by another department of the government. He preferred taking the higher
ground and, no doubt, the wiser one. He rested the case
upon the total want of power in the judicial department to
undertake to control the Executive in anything that involved discretion. Impliedly, he said, or rather the Court
,decided, that the question of the legality, of an act of Congress in reference to matters of government could not be
discussed by the judicial department of the government
before some overt act, and then only by action, indictment
or impeachment. He pointed out that there was another
tribunal appointed for this purpose by the law, if the
criminal held official position, viz.: the Senate, on an impeachment, and they might impeach for not obeying while
this Court was prohibiting obedience. And he contented
himself by simply denying the power to enjoin the Presi,dent in the performance of his official duties, and with one
touch of ridicule by quoting the words of his great predeces-sor, MARSHALL, "an absurd and excessive extravagance,"
as justly characterizing an attempt by the judicial tribunal
to enforce executive and political duties.
There was thus, however, lost an opportunity for
speaking out by one that could not but be listened to even
if not comprehended, and of giving to the people of the
lUnited States some little conception of the inherent and
,essential features of the subjects proper to be committed to
a court of equity. Had he but said, "Where is the equity
-ofthis bill, and what do you understand by that word you
.are always repeating, and do you have any real conception
of its meaning ?-certainly the draughtsmen of this bill
had not-did any one before ever conceive that illegality
,creates an equity ?-it may be an essential element in the
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equity, but if illegality constitutes or creates the equity

there can be no wrong or crime that is not within the
jurisdiction, yet it is only when the law cannot give the
proper redress that such a jurisdiction exists," he would
have rendered essential benefit to American jurisprudence.
Possibly he may have apprehended that he would be giving
support to the notion that the form of the remedy only was
mistaken; and if he was dealing with a bar whose brains
were sufficiently addled to try the experiment of a inandaius, he was very wise to extinguish all hope of involving the judiciary in the absurd attempt to administer thegovernment as if it were an insolvent corporation.
If any should say the English judges gave no reason
for these limitations to equity jurisdiction, it is sufficient
to reply that they were speaking to an educated class to.
whom the reasons were self-evident. When we find Lord
ELDON taking infinite pains to explain when and whereand under what circumstances and for what reason he is
justified in interfering to prevent the destruction of property,
and not to put the man to an action for damages, we may
be quite sure that he saw a reason and a serious one for the
rule. If the jurisdiction is improper in the case of a most
vexatious trespass, such as entering into private grounds
or going over enclosures, must not the same objections
exist to similar acts when rising to the dignity of a violation of the statute law? Those who commend the practice
of extending the forms of equity procedure, and those whoseek for the means for curtailing extension equally overlook these practical reasons.
But to comply with the request that has led to this
paper, it is necessary to call attention to the subject in detail. It is not a sufficient reason against the new system,
looking at the question as one of policy, or from the standpoint of politics, that such-a jurisdiction has never before
been exercised. That may be sufficient in a court-it may
be none against the grant of the jurisdiction by a legislature. What has been said in reference to English jurists,
including some of the most illustrious of our own, is to
make it clear that they declined the jurisdiction and denied
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its existence. But the purpose of this paper is not to defend the courts for declining the jurisdiction, but to state
the reasons against its creation. The courts will readily
acquiesce in a denial of a jurisdiction that has never been
exercised, if it is seen to be of such a character that it is a
violation of the fundamental principles of free government
to confer it.
Equity jurisprudence as applied to crime and as distinguished from that of law is preventive only. Let us
now look at what the jurisdiction would be were it not
preventive. Injunctions would then be impossible, for,
while there are such things as injunctions after the wrong
done, they are confined, of course, only to the case wherethe wrong may be righted, and things replaced as they
were; as, for instance, a building may be erected contrary
to a covenant, and the builder may be compelled to restore
the land to its former condition.
And here it may be observed there is no pretence of a
jurisdiction conferred to try or punish the offence created
by the statute. It is because it is a preventive that it is
commended in the opinion of the Supreme Court, and it is
the preventive jurisdiction only that is supposed to be conferred. And yet I am aware of no crime or misdemeanor
in which this preventive remedy by injunction is possible.
Certainly it cannot be applied to an unlicensed sale of a
dramn. It is too absurd even for a joke. What, then, is the
practical, what is the inevitable and necessary result of applying the preventive remedy? Look at it as it must occur. A person is suspected of an intention to do the forbidden thing. He is enjoined not to do it by a judge. If
he does it he has committed two wrongs,-one is the violation of the prohibition in the statute ; the other is the violation of the command of theJudge not to violate the statute.
It is the one single act that constitutes the disobedience.
What is the inmediate consequence ? The command of
the statute is overlooked and its violation is disregarded;
or if that is punished, and also the disobedience to the
judge's order, the mai is punished twice for the same
offence. There is, of course, nothing of prevention here.
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If, however, punishment is dealt with as a preventive, then
the disobedience, which consisted in doing what is prohibited by the statute, is punished after that kind of trial that
does apply to the breach of an injunction. And what is
that? A trial by affidavits-that is, by evidence given by
witnesses-given in the form they see fit, without the form
of conducting what is called a cross-examination-that is,
by asking questions explanatory of the statement. And in
what respect is this preventive; except as the fear of punishment is preventive, and how does this differ from the
fear of the sentence of a court of law, saving that one has
and the other has not a right to a trial by due course of
law ? It is difficult to make any one not accustomed to the
administration of justice comprehend the importance of
this, and how utterly absurd and iniquitous it would be to
apply this system to what is really a violation of the criminal law. Apply it honorably-that is, as the courts of
equity do apply it-and the whole thing would be a laughing-stock. The accused has but to deny the fact on affidavit. When has it been found that a defendant was committed for contempt after his denial of such a fact as this
must be? And is it desirable to compel the accused to
choose between perjury or committing himself?
The whole scheme is a most unworthy perversion of
the forms of justice. It is a mere evasion of the principles
of law, and these principles are those on which, with the
writ of habeas corpus, the whole system of criminal jurisprudence as a matter of politics rests.
To make this plain, the following observations are sufficient : If the jurisdiction, to punish for a violation of the
license law, when there is a violation, or for a violation of
the prohibitions of all use of intoxicants, whether by sale
or gift, is intended to be given to the Courts of Chancery,
nothing whatever is done but to change the form of procedure by indictment to injunction.
In imagining the
jurisdiction is preventive the legislature is deceiving
itself and the community. In place of an indictment
and a public prosecution, a grand jury, a court using common law forms, which require a jury to determine the
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fact, and a judge to determine all matters of law, including
the sufficiency of the evidence and the nature of the proof,
there are substituted a bill, answer, proofs in writing, and a
hearing before a judge without the right of appeal.
If there is no constitutional guarantee of the right to
the trial by jury, then there is nothing to prevent the legislature doing this as a matter offiower. The only remark
to be made is that it would be far better to give the samepower to punish to the ordinary courts and by common law
forms. No possible benefit will result from the noveltyThe offence will be much more speedily and certainly punished by the common law courts. All that is effected by
the change is to confuse men's notions, and impose an expensive and dilatory system in place of a speedy and cheap.
one. No one who has the slightest knowledge of equity
can fail to see that what the Legislature of Iowa has done
is simply absurd, except to evade a trial by jury. Was.
anything but this the real intention ? It is the extraordinary powers of the Court of Chancery that the framers of
these laws designed to-apply to assist in suppressing the
evil of dram-drinking, and to the enforcing the prohibitory
laws of the State, concealing the fact that they had removed the right of trial by jury. So far as the punishment
is concerned, that cannot differ because of the court
which is to enforce it. It would be something worse than
absurd to provide that a court of equity may impose a
heavier penalty for a violation of a statute than a court of
law is permitted to do.
There is another form of relief which the forms of
equity furnish, that is one compelling some act to be done.
It is, however, obvious that in reference to the violation of the
law there can be nothing done after the violation but punish.
To confer this jurisdiction on courts of equity, therefore,
has no possible meaning or object but to sanction and
punish a misdemeanor without the intervention of a jury..
The objections, therefore, to this novelty begin and end
with this change. If it is proposed and is deemed wise
and proper to make this change in the forms of law, and to.
substitute a judge for the jury to try facts constituting.
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crimes or misdemeanors, it is idle to waste time declaiming on the mere nonsense of doing it in this round-about
way. But no one can read the act and suppose that this
was the real intention. It is the preventive remedy of
Chancery Courts that was intended to be conferred, and
which alone is in question.
It is immaterial as a question of power that no such
thing has ever been done, or that such things are not
within the jurisdiction of courts of equity. Legislatures
may, if not restrained by a constitution, confer jurisdiction
in this 'case on the courts of equity, as it may as to another
crime. It may make all crimes punishable only by an action for damages, and it may enforce contracts by hanging
for failure to perform.
Granting, therefore, the power, what are the objections?
Precisely and solely these. The whole system of administering the criminal laws is changed in the one particular
that we and our ancestors have thought essential to political freedom, and which the experience of the world proves
there is no other sure support for that which is beyond all
price-that is, assuring to the accused of any crime for
which there can be fine and imprisonment imposed, a
trial by jury, according to the course of the common lawthat is, with the witnesses produced and examined in the
presence of the accused and before the world.
If these things are not deemed important, there is
nothing more to be said.
If the fact of a violation of the order of the judge not
to sell is tried as a misdemeanor, nothing is gained by the
grant of the jurisdiction. But it cannot be tried in that
way. No court has jurisdiction to try for contempt but the
one whose order is disobeyed. That court and judge must
decide the facts as the forms of the jurisdiction conferred
require. If this fact of the contempt is to be tried by a
jury indirectly, the whole thing becomes so absurd as to be
incapable of discussion. If it is not to be so tried, the"real
purpose of this legislation is to confer a jurisdiction over
one class of misdemeanors on a judge who* may try it on
ex-parle evidence without opportunity for cross-examine.
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Where will this stop? Will any one deny that the
only justification pretended is that the tribunal appointed
for such purpose declines convicting? Thus it comes to
this. We are to introduce a system denounced as outrageous when applied, under the name of coercion, to a people
avowing a determination not to enforce the law, merely
to carry out one newly-conceived scheme of moral reform,
because the community will not submit to such dictation.
Is not this a prodigious political blunder?

And what will

become of the judiciary compelled to exercise what the people will believe to be merely a capricious power?
NOTE.
The case of Eilenbecken v. District Court of Plymouth County, reported in 139 U. S., 31, arose, like so many other cases which have been
taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, out of the policy of
that State in attempting to suppress the traffic in intoxicating liquors.
Section 1534 of the Code of Iowa, as amended by C. 143 of the Acts
of the Twentieth General Assembly, is as follows:
Sec. 1534: "In case of violation of the provisions of either of the
three preceding sections or of Section 1525 of this chapter, the building
or erection of whatever kind, or the ground itself, in or upon which such
unlawful manufacture, or sale, or keeping, with intent to sell, use or give
away, of any intoxicating liquors, is carried on, or continued, or exists,
and the furniture, fixtures, vessels and contents, is hereby declared a
nuisance, and shall be abated as hereinafter provided; and whoever shall
erect, or establish, or continue, or use any building, erection or place for
any of the purposes prohibited in said sections, shall be deemed guilty of
a nuisance, and may be prosecuted and punished accordingly, and, upon
conviction, shall pay a fine not exceeding $1,ooo and costs of prosecution, and stand committed until the fine and costs are paid; and the provisions of Chap. 47, Title 25, of this Code, shall not be applicable to
persons committed under this section. Any citizen of the county where
such nuisance exists, or is kept or maintained, may maintain an action
in equity to abate and perpetually enjoin the same; and any person violating the terms of any injunction granted in such proceeding shall be
punished, as for contempt, by fine of not less than $5oo nor more than
$i,ooo, or by imprisonment in the county jail not more than six months,
or by both, such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court."
This statute thus declares it is a crime to sell liquor or to keep liquor
for sale, and provides for prosecution according to common law forms.
It provides that any citizen may further maintain an action in equity
against any person who, he alleges, keeps liquor for sale, to abate or perpetually enjoin said person from a further violation of the law. The Court,
whether convinced or not of the truth of the allegation, may grant an injunction restraining the person against whom the bill is filed from selling
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liquor. For violating the terms of this injunction-in other words, for
selling liquor or keeping the same for sale--the Court, on proof by
affidavit of the fact of the violation, having no personal knowledge of
the facts, shall adjudge him in contempt of court.
Unlike all other punishments for contempt, the maximum and minimum punishment is fixed by the statute.
With this law in force, on the eleventh day of June, 1885, separate
petitions in equity were filed in the District Court of Plymouth County
against each of the plaintiffs in error, praying that they should be
enjoined from selling or keeping for sale intoxicating liquors, including
ale, wine and beer. On the 6th of July, the Court ordered the issue of
preliminary injunctions as prayed.
On the 7 th of July, the writs were
served on each of the defendants in each proceeding by the sheriff of
Plymouth County. On the 24th of October. complaints were filed,
alleging that the plaintiffs in error had violated this injunction by selling
intoxicating liquors contrary to the law and the terms of the injunction
served on them, and asking that they be required to show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt of court. A rule was granted
accordingly, and the Court ordered that a hearing be had at the next term
of the Court upon affidavits; and on the eighth day of March, 1886, it
being at the regular term of said District Court, separate trials were had
upon evidence in the form of affidavits, by the Court without a jury,
upon which the plaintiffs were found. guilty of a violation of the writs of
the injunction issued in said cause, and the sentence of fine and imprisonment entered against them.
The Supreme Court of the State on a writ of certiorariaffirmed thisjudgment. The third assignment of error, which was the only one of any
importance, was, that the statute in question was void because in effect it
deprived the plaintiffs, who are charged with selling intoxicating liquors,
"of the equal protection of the laws, and it prejudices the rights an&.
privileges of that particular class of persons, and denies to them the right
of trial by jury, while in all other prosecutions the accused must first be
presented by indictment, and then have the benefit of trial by jury of his
peers."
The Court, per Mr. Justice MILLER, held, first, that the record did not
show whether the plaintiffs would have been denied a trial by jury had
they demanded it; and, second, that it was within the power of the Court
to issue the injunction. The opinion of the late Ir. Justice Miller, however, goes far beyond this. He considers, in the first place, that the
offence is one against the Court, and not against the statute. After deciding that a court has power to punish for contempt without intervention
of a jury, the learned jurist continues:
"The counsel for plaintiffs in error seek to evade the force of this
reasoning by the proposition that the entire statute under -which this
injunction was issued is in the nature of a criminal proceeding, and that
the contempt of court of which these parties have been found guilty is
a crime for the punishment of which they have right to trial by jury.
"We cannot accede to this view of the subject. Whether an attachment for a contempt of court, and the judgment of the Court punishing

